BYU Law Review
Volume 2016 | Issue 1

Article 11

February 2016

The Peril of Paroline: How the Supreme Court
Made It More Difficult for Victims of Child
Pornography
Janet Lawrence

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, and the
Supreme Court of the United States Commons
Recommended Citation
Janet Lawrence, The Peril of Paroline: How the Supreme Court Made It More Difficult for Victims of Child Pornography, 2016 BYU L. Rev.
325 (2016).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2016/iss1/11

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

07.LAWRENCE.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

8/4/2016 6:11 PM

The Peril of Paroline: How the Supreme Court Made
It More Difficult for Victims of Child Pornography
“[E]xtremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. And . . .
moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue.”
—Barry Goldwater 1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Congress passed the Mandatory Restitution Provision
as a way to help those who have suffered enormous losses as child
pornography victims. 2 “Andy” 3 is one of those victims. FBI Special
Agent Jeff Ross had received a file on a young boy who was being
repeatedly sexually abused by an adult male. The National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) sent him the file after
determining that the abuse occurred in Utah from hearing a radio ad
for a Utah car dealer and “see[ing] a Salt Lake City telephone
directory in the background” of a video. 4 Agent Ross had a break in
the case and was able to learn the name of the victim, the city where
he lived, and the name of the abuser—Antonio Cardenas. 5
For three of the five years Cardenas volunteered as a “big
brother” to Andy, he had sexually abused Andy and documented the
abuse with video and photos. The first video of him showed acts of
sexual abuse on a blanket decorated with the Nickelodeon cartoon,
SpongeBob Squarepants. The series of videos became known as the
“SpongeBob” series in the underground child-porn community and
is among the most widely distributed child pornography on the

1. Senator Barry Goldwater, Speech Accepting the Republican Presidential
Nomination
(Jul.
16,
1964),
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/
barrygoldwater1964rnc.htm.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (2012).
3. “Andy” is a pseudonym used to protect the victim’s identity.
4. Brooke Adams, For FBI Agent, Luck and Dedication Cracked Child Porn Case,
SALT LAKE TRIB. (June 24, 2012), http://archive.sltrib.com/story.php?ref=/sltrib/news/
54341564-78/ross-cardenas-child-utah.html.csp.
5. Id.
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Internet. 6 Cardenas repeatedly raped the child, acts that he deemed
as “consensual sex” performed in the name of love. Cardenas
believes that there is nothing criminal or inherently wrong with
having sex with children. He thinks that laws should be changed to
decriminalize this behavior. 7
At one point, Cardenas lost his job and decided to move back
with his parents in Mexico. He wanted to profit as the “creator of
SpongeBob” from his videos and contacted private child-porn
traders “to get everything from anybody with nothing but my
name.” 8 He knew he “had a very unique, special, tradable, beautiful
kid series with which to climb up the pornography ladder,” and
would be able to “get access to things [he] always wanted to see but
could never get hold of.” 9 In a short time span, he “felt like [he] was
god, [he] was at the top of the game.” 10
Antonio Cardenas was arrested January 10, 2010, and the story
of Andy’s abuse came to light. 11 At Cardenas’s sentencing, Andy’s
mother brought in two large boxes containing hundreds of brown
envelopes, each a victim-notification statement regarding a case
where a defendant was charged with possessing “SpongeBob”
images. His mother poignantly observed, “Every one of those
envelopes represents perverts looking at pictures of my son.” 12 At the
time of sentencing, there were at least 500 defendants. 13 Today, that
number is rapidly approaching 1,000. 14

6. Brief for “Vicky” & “Andy” as Amici Curiae Supporting Amy Unknown at 3,
Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (No. 12.8561).
7. Stephen Dark, Warped Desire: Inside the Mind of a Child Pornographer, SALT LAKE
CITY
WKLY.
(Aug.
01,
2012),
http://www.cityweekly.net/utah/warpeddesire/Content?oid=2284115&showFullText=true.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. This number is based on a count of the number of cases recorded with the Utah
Crime Victims Legal Clinic as of December 2014. The Utah Crime Victims Legal Clinic
receives notices on a regular basis and the number is expected to continue to increase.
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Andy’s losses encompass psychological counseling and future lost
income. Andy also seeks restitution for expenses for a forensic
psychological exam and follow-up report and an econometric
calculation of his actual losses as a necessary precursor to his
restitution requests, as well as legal fees. 15 Andy’s case is precisely the
situation Congress had in mind when it passed 18 U.S.C. § 2259,
the Mandatory Restitution Provision, which applies to child
pornography victims.
In a report to Congress, the U.S. Department of Justice
defined child pornography as “the possession, trade, advertising,
and production of images that depict the sexual abuse of
children.” 16 It is worth noting that the term child pornography has
fallen out of favor among experts in the field because the “use of
that term contributes to a fundamental misunderstanding of the
crime—one that focuses on the possession or trading of a picture
and leaves the impression that what is depicted in the photograph is
pornography. Child pornography is unrelated to adult
pornography; it clearly involves the criminal depiction and
memorializing of the sexual assault of children and the criminal
sharing, collecting, and marketing of the images.” 17
There is a rising preference for calling these photographs
indecent images of children, child exploitation materials, and child
abuse images, which “is thought to more adequately capture the
content of these images and the ways that they are used, and move

15.
16.

Sample Restitution Request, Utah Crime Victims Legal Clinic (on file with author).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITATION
PREVENTION AND INTERDICTION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 8 (2010).
17. Id.; see RICHARD WORTLEY & STEPHEN SMALLBONE, INTERNET CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY: CAUSES, INVESTIGATION, AND PREVENTION 7–9 (Graeme R. Newman ed.,
2012) (“There is much debate in the literature and among advocacy groups and law
enforcement agencies about the proper term for sexual material involving children. Some have
objected to the term child pornography on the grounds that it trivializes the severity of the
offense by linking the problem too closely with the legal production and consumption of adult
pornography . . . .”); Paul G. Cassell et al., The Case for Full Restitution for Child Pornography
Victims, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 61, 68 (2013) (“[A]lthough the term ‘child pornography’ is
widely used, it carries misleading cultural connotations. The term ‘pornography’ equates child
pornography with erotic material appealing to the viewer’s normative sexual interest, and is
neither the best nor the most accurate term to describe, for example, images and videos which
graphically record children being raped.”) (footnotes omitted).
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us away from uncritical comparisons with adult pornography.”18
However, in this Comment, the term “child pornography” will be
used “because it is the legal and accepted term for images of child
sexual abuse,” 19 it is what is used in legislation and by law
enforcement, and it is easily identifiable by the general public.
This Comment looks at the way the Mandatory Restitution
Provision developed, how it has been interpreted, and how Congress
has responded to the Court’s decision. Part II examines some of the
motivations and public issues that informed congressional action on
behalf of the victims of child pornography. Part III introduces the
victims the government represented in the recent Supreme Court
decision regarding the Mandatory Restitution Provision, Paroline v.
United States. 20 Part IV discusses the Paroline decision, including the
framework for courts as embedded in the canons of construction
used when interpreting statutes, the particular interpretive problems
Paroline presents, how the Court interpreted the statute, and the
effects and continuing problems that exist in the wake of Paroline.
Part V concludes.
II. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE GROWING CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY TREND
In response to “a rising tide of violence . . . target[ing] American
women both in the streets and in their own homes” with “increasing
incidence of rape, sexual assault and domestic violence,” 21 Congress
enacted the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in 1994, which
serves all victims of sexual abuse and domestic violence regardless of
age or gender. 22 Acknowledging that sexual assault “carries with it
long-term psychological wounds” along with “often serious physical

18. Ethel Quayle & Roberta Sinclair, An Introduction to the Problem, in
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING ONLINE SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN 4 (Ethel
Quayle & Kurt M. Ribisl eds., 2012) (citations omitted).
19. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 8 (emphasis omitted).
20. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014).
21. H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 25 (1993).
22. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001–703, 108
Stat. 1796, 1902–55 (1994) (enacted as Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994).
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injuries” that would both need treatment, 23 this act required courts
to order defendants to pay “the full amount of the victim’s losses” as
restitution 24 to victims of child sexual abuse falling under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251 et seq., including not only the creation and distribution of
child pornography, but also possession of child pornography. 25 Child
victims of sexual assault experience actual harm and long-term effects
that require ongoing treatment.
A. Mandatory Restitution
Congress intended that child pornography victims receive full
compensation from their offenders. 26 Child pornography victims
are entitled to restitution in the full amount of their eligible losses
from defendants convicted of possessing or distributing their
images. 27 Full restitution
includes any costs incurred by the victim for—(A) medical services
relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care; (B) physical
and occupational therapy or rehabilitation; (C) necessary
transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses; (D)
lost income; (E) attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and
(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of
the offense. 28

Ordering restitution is mandatory, seemingly imposing joint and
several liability on each defendant. 29 “A court may not decline to
[order restitution] because of the economic circumstances of the
defendant; or the fact that a victim has, or is entitled to, receive
compensation for his or her injuries from the proceeds of insurance

23. H.R. REP. NO. 130-395, at 26 (1993). Victims are “8.7 times as likely as nonvictims to have attempted suicide and twice as likely to experience major depression.” Id.
(quoting Victims of Rape: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and
Families, 101st Cong. 37 (1990) (statement of Dean G. Kilpatrick, Ph.D.).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (2012).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a), (b)(4) (2012).
26. See id. § 2259(b)(1).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 2259(b)(1), (3).
29. Id. § 2259(b)(4)(A).
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or any other source.” 30 This provision supports “Congress’s wellfounded recognition that the possession and distribution of child
pornography causes significant harm to the victims depicted in those
images. The endless circulation of a victim’s child sex images subjects
victims to continuous invasions of privacy that cause lasting
psychological injury” 31 that can be measured in economic losses. 32
This provision also supports the declaration in the Crime Victim’s
Rights Act, 33 which states that “[a] crime victim has . . . [t]he right
to full and timely restitution as provided in law.” 34
Congress enacted the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996
to amend its predecessor, the Victim and Witness Protection Act of
1982. 35 In a committee report to the House of Representatives on
the proposed Victim Restitution Act regarding restitution to victims
of crime, the threefold purpose was delineated: 1) “to ensure that
the loss to crime victims is recognized, and that they receive the
restitution that they are due,” 2) “to ensure that the offender
realizes the damage caused by the offense and pays the debt owed to
the victim as well as to society,” and 3) “to replace an existing
patchwork of different rules governing orders of restitution under
various Federal criminal statutes with one consistent procedure.”36
This Act reinforces the mandatory nature of restitution orders for
the crimes covered in 18 U.S.C. § 2259, and was not intended to
change the “scope of restitution authorized by the mandatory
restitution provisions of the Violence Against Women Act . . . .” 37

30. Id. § 2259(b)(4)(B).
31. Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 66.
32. Id.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6) (2012). This Act was signed into law on October 30,
2004, greatly enhancing the victim’s role in criminal proceedings. See Victims’ Rights, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 8, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/usao/priority-areas/victims-rightsservices/victims-rights.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6) (2012).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012).
36. S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 12 (1995); see Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 201–11, 110 Stat. 1214, 1227–41 (1996) (enacted as Title II,
Subtitle A of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996).
37. S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 19 (1995).
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B. Victims of Child Pornography
An understanding of the impact of being a victim of internet
child pornography can aid in an understanding of the indivisible
nature of the harm done by those who possess these images—the
focus should be on the harm to the victim, not on what is in the
images or even the offender’s perception of his own role in the
victimization. 38 To understand the motivation behind Congress’s
actions in passing the Mandatory Restitution Act, it is helpful to look
at the actual harm done to the child victims of sexual assault.
Congress has relied on reports and evidence from various agencies
depicting the trauma and continuing effects of sexual assault in the
ongoing process of strengthening protection for children. 39 Child
pornography, which has become increasingly prevalent with growing
ease of access to the internet, is a major concern. 40 The Honorable
John Adams decried the current state of affairs, proclaiming that
“[g]iven the current statistics surrounding child pornography, we are
living in a country that is losing its soul.” 41 In an influential 1982
decision, New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court found that child
pornography and the intrinsically related sexual abuse of children
harm the victims because “the materials produced are a permanent
record of the children’s participation and the harm to the child is
exacerbated by their circulation.” 42
As horrible as the original abuse is for the victim, “its
memorialization, distribution, and viewing are psychologically

38. Marcella Mary Leonard, “I Did What I Was Directed to Do but He Didn’t Touch
Me”: The Impact of Being a Victim of Internet Offending, 16 J. SEXUAL AGGRESSION 249,
249–50 (2010).
39. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760 n.11 (1982) (quoting Sexual
Exploitation of Children: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Judiciary Comm.,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1977) (statement of Frank Osanka, Professor of Social Justice and
Sociology) (“[We] have to be very careful . . . that we don’t take comfort in the existence of
statutes that are on the books in the connection with the use of children in pornography.”).
40. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 16.
41. Id. at 1 (quoting United States v. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D.
Ohio 2010)).
42. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
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intertwined with and compound the impact of the abuse.” 43 The
American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children (APSAC)
notes that “[i]t is not only that a child is sexually assaulted or abused
as part of its production that makes child pornography so damaging,
but also the fact that detailed and graphic images of the child’s
sexual assault or abuse are made available to millions across the
globe.” 44 And “each person who views the images inflicts fresh
damage to the victim. . . . The harm is multiplied by the very size of
the global marketplace.” 45 These harms include their images being
used to increase the demand for child pornography and the victims
knowing that their images are being used for the sexual gratification
of others.
Victims are first harmed by the sexual assault memorialized in
heinous images, and then re-victimized every time these images are
shared over the Internet with a worldwide audience. 46 The
anonymous nature of the Internet makes it difficult to identify and
locate the offenders, who often meet up in online communities
where trading images is “one component of a larger relationship that
is premised on a shared sexual interest in children.” 47 Having a
“support group” in their network of online “friends” makes these
perpetrators bolder, erodes the shame usually present with this kind
of behavior, and desensitizes the viewers to the damage, both
physical and psychological, experienced by the children, creating a
self-reinforcing cycle that fuels an increasing demand for more
images. 48 “In the world of child pornography, this demand drives
supply. The individual collector who methodically gathers one image
after another has the effect of validating the production of the image,
which leads only to more production.” 49

43. Amicus Brief of the American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children
Supporting Respondent at 6, Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (No. 128561) [hereinafter APSAC Brief].
44. Id. at 5.
45. Id.
46. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 3.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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The children who are sexually exploited on the Internet suffer a
special kind of harm through their knowledge that the images of
their abuse are being used for the sexual gratification of countless
pedophiles at their expense. Academic researchers, medical
professionals, and child pornography victims themselves report that
knowing that it is impossible to remove or retrieve all copies of
child pornography images “compounds the victimization.” 50 The
victims’ shame is deepened by the knowledge that their abuse was
recorded in images readily available to others, and the children are
re-victimized each time those images are used for sexual
gratification. 51 “[T]hese children struggle to find closure and may
be more prone to feelings of helplessness and lack of control, given
that the images cannot be retrieved and are available for others to
see in perpetuity. They experience anxiety as a result of the
perpetual fear of humiliation that they will be recognized from the
images.” 52 The victims of child pornography are denied their right
to privacy and fundamental human dignity when the images of
their abuse are posted to the Internet, never again to be fully
retracted once they have started circulating and being viewed by
others. 53 “The possessor thus has real victims and inflicts actual
harm upon them by his conduct.” 54

50. Id. at 9.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 847, 853–
54 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
54. Id. at 854. The mother of one victim describes the harm her daughter
experienced:
The pictures of my daughter were “made for trade”— her abuser adapted to serve
his market—whatever his audience was looking to acquire, that’s what happened to
her . . . Producer, distributor, and consumer—everyone who participates in this evil
exchange helps create a market, casting a vote for the next abuse. Regardless of
whether they directly abused children themselves, reveled in the images of suffering,
or persuaded others to abuse children on their behalf (to provide images of the
abuse) each participant has a responsibility for the effects . . . . I can find no words
to express the fury I feel at those who participate in this evil, or my scorn for any
attempt to minimize responsibility by feeble claims that the crime was “victimless.”
My daughter is a real person. She was horribly victimized to provide this source of
“entertainment.” She is exploited anew each and every time an image of her
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Pornography is not only an end-product, but also a common
element of grooming. 55 In the process of grooming, the offender
attempts to normalize sexual behavior in the “offender-child
relationship by introducing increasingly intimate physical contact by
the offender toward the victim, very gradually sexualizing the
contact, and sometimes using child pornography to break down the
child’s barriers.” 56 As part of their methodology, child pornography
is introduced to demonstrate desired behaviors with suggestive
images and nudity. 57 The offender is usually in a position of authority
and trust over the immature and submissive child—a combination
that makes it possible to subdue the child’s resistance through a
gradual process. 58 Then, actual sexual abuse ensues. The victims have
little or no control over their situation and circumstances and have
difficulty comprehending what is happening and why. 59 Having likely
been subjected to the grooming process themselves, victims suffer
even more knowing that the images of their horrific experiences are
being used by predators to condition more victims. 60
Child sex victims typically experience long-term psychological
harm and need lifelong care. 61 There is usually pressure from the
offender to elicit cooperation and secrecy from his victim. 62 The
impact of sexual abuse encompasses post-traumatic stress syndrome
(PTSD), trauma symptoms, presentations of depression, anxiety, selfabusive behaviors, substance abuse, and low self-esteem, as well as
sexual and relationship difficulties. 63 After being abused, child victims
“may feel grief, guilt and fear,” resulting in behavior that reflects an

suffering is copied, traded, or sold. While the crime is clearly conscienceless, it is
hardly “victimless.”
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 10.
55. APSAC Brief, supra note 43, at 9.
56. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 21.
57. Id. at 31.
58. Id. at 21.
59. Id.
60. APSAC Brief, supra note 43, at 3.
61. Id. at 10.
62. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 17, at 15.
63. Leonard, supra note 38, at 249–50.
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“inability to trust, cognitive confusion, lack of mastery and control,
repressed anger and hostility, blurred boundaries and role confusion,
pseudo-maturity, and failure to complete development tasks,
depression, and poor social skills.” 64
Victims also feel shame because of their self-perceived complicity,
a perception that is often encouraged by their offender, and a
conflicting sense of loyalty to the offender. 65 Later in life, those initial
feelings of “shame and anxiety” do not fade, rather they intensify to
“deep despair, worthlessness, and hopelessness.” 66 Their experiences
often yield a “distorted model of sexuality,” and victims frequently
have difficulty “establishing and maintaining healthy emotional and
sexual relationships.” 67
Studies have recognized that child sex victims are at higher risk
for health problems such as depression, alcoholism, illicit drug use,
unintended pregnancies, and sexually transmitted diseases. 68 One
study found a “direct neural mechanism, via alteration of the brain’s
fear circuitry . . . [where] maltreatment [led] to anxiety and
depressive symptoms by late adolescence.” 69 Female victims in
particular are at “an increased risk of further sexual victimization
later in life—often in apparently unrelated circumstances . . . .
[W]omen who had experienced sexual abuse as a child were twice as
likely as previously non-victimized women to be raped.” 70
Child pornography victims experience even greater harm. After
the initial abuse, every time the pornographic images are viewed by
others, the children depicted are victimized again. One expert noted
that “[t]he victim’s knowledge of publication of the visual material

64. APSAC Brief, supra note 43, at 12 (citation omitted).
65. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 17, at 15.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. APSAC Brief, supra note 43, at 10.
69. Id. at 11 (quoting Ryan J. Herringa et al., Childhood Maltreatment Is Associated
with Altered Fear Circuitry and Increased Internalizing Symptoms by Late Adolescence, PNAS
EARLY ED. (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2013/10/30/
1310766110.full.pdf+html).
70. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 17, at 73.
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increases the emotional and psychic harm suffered by the child.” 71
The exponential growth of the circulation of the pictures on the
Internet causes these feelings to be continual, because at any given
time, the images are in circulation and every stranger a victim meets
can be an offender. This type of exposure causes a never-ending
barrage of feelings of shame, humiliation, and powerlessness
requiring lifelong care. 72 Child pornography victims experience
exacerbated negative effects. 73
“Each time the image is viewed is experienced as a fresh assault
by the victim . . . . [V]ictims feel ‘impotent because they will have
had no control over the disclosure process—they have not been able
to choose when to disclose, what to disclose, how to disclose, and to
whom they want to disclose.’” 74 Because victims do not know who
these viewers may be and how many there are, they develop a
“general feeling of unsafeness, feeling sexualized, feeling victimized
because they cannot identify their perpetrators” because they do not
know who the perpetrators are. They “could be people whom they
meet every day in shops, offices, leisure centres, church, school and
parks, as well as people whom they know.” 75 Victims are profoundly
affected by
the knowledge of what the unknown perpetrators are doing
sexually to their picture every time one of the perpetrators views
that picture . . . [and] the realization of the quantity of people who
are looking, not past-tense looked but still present-tense looking, at
their pictures . . . gaining and performing sexual gratification to
their pictures at any time of the day. 76

71. Rogers, supra note 53, at 854 (quoting T. Christopher Donnelly, Protection of
Children from Use in Pornography: Toward Constitutional and Enforceable Legislation, 12 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 295, 301 (1979)).
72. Id. at 853–54 (footnotes omitted).
73. APSAC Brief, supra note 4343, at 12.
74. Id. at 13.
75. Leonard, supra note 38, at 252.
76. Id. at 253. In Amy’s Victim Impact Statement, she describes how she is affected by
this knowledge:
Every day of my li[f]e I live in constant fear that someone will see my pictures and
recognize me and that I will be humiliated all over again. It hurts to know someone
is looking at them—at me—when I was just a little girl being abused for the camera.
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The perpetrators of these ongoing fresh assaults based on possession
of the images are not separable to the victims from the creators or
the distributors.
III. VICTIMS AMY 77 AND VICKY 78 AND THEIR QUEST FOR
RESTITUTION
The primary purpose of the Mandatory Restitution Act
seems clear: to provide mandatory restitution in full to the
victim for his or her losses. 79 However, this has not been the case
as illustrated by the situations of Amy and Vicky, both victims of
Internet child pornography.
Amy and her uncle shared a “special secret.” 80 That “secret”
involved her uncle telling her that he loved her while raping her,
forcing her to endure masturbation, cunnilingus, fellatio, and
digital and anal penetration. 81 But Amy’s uncle did not keep their
“special secret.” Amy is the victim depicted in what has been
dubbed the “Misty” series. 82 Amy’s uncle forced her to pose for
photographs in response to specific requests from Internet users, 83
and forced her to communicate with “followers.” 84 Some of the
assaults on her were perpetrated in order to provide child

I did not choose to be there, but now I am there forever in pictures that people are
using to do sick things.
Jonathan R. Hornok, Note, A Right to Contribution and Federal Restitution Orders, 2013
UTAH L. REV. 661, 663 n.17 (2013) (quoting Government’s Memorandum of Law Regarding
the Victims’ Losses at 8, United States v. Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2010) (No.
09-243), 2010 WL 6845823).
77. “Amy” is a pseudonym used to protect the victim’s identity.
78. “Vicky” is a pseudonym used to protect the victim’s identity.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (1996).
80. Hornok, supra note 76, at 663.
81. Id.
82. Brief of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children on Issues of
Restitution for Victims of Child Pornography Under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 at 6, United States v.
Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 6:08-CR-61) [hereinafter NCMEC Brief].
83. Hornok, supra note 76, at 663.
84. Id.
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pornography for a child molester in the Seattle area, making her
also a victim of child sexual exploitation. 85
At the age of nine, Amy underwent psychological counseling to
come to terms with the devastating trauma she had endured at the
hands of her uncle. 86 Eventually, Amy got to a point where her
therapist reported that she was “back to normal.” 87 Then, at the age
of seventeen, Amy learned that images of her abuse were in the
hands of countless individuals and were a popular trade item among
pedophiles. 88 “Amy’s use of a pseudonym reflects a painful irony: she
seeks anonymity, but hers is among the most widely trafficked ‘series’
of child pornography in the world.” 89
Vicky was also sexually abused at a young age. 90 Her abuser took
requests from pedophiles and then forced Vicky to perform those
requests, including rape, anal penetration, and bondage. 91 Vicky also
learned of the widespread distribution of the images of her abuse
many years later. 92 This knowledge has had a profound, negative
impact on her psychological well-being. 93
Amy has received notice of more than 1,500 defendants who
were found in possession of her images. 94 Prior to the recent

85. Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 70; see also NCMEC Brief, supra note 82.
86. Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 70.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (citations omitted).
90. Hornok, supra note 76, at 664.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
When I learn . . . about [a] defendant having downloaded the pictures of me, it adds
to my paranoia, it makes me feel again like I was being abused by another man who
had been leering at pictures of my naked body being tortured, it gives me chills to
think about. I live in fear that any of them, may try to find me and contact me and
do something to me. I have been contacted by some of them and some have said
terrible things to me. The fact that each one is out there and has seen me and
watched me being raped makes me sicker, makes me feel less safe, makes me feel
more ashamed and humiliated.
Id. (quoting Government’s Memorandum of Law Regarding the Victims’ Losses at 8, United
States v. Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 09-243), 2010 WL 6845823).
94. Hornok, supra note 76, at 666.
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Supreme Court decision in Paroline, her attorney routinely
requested restitution for the full amount of her losses from each
defendant. 95 The full amount of her losses is $3,367,854 and
includes future treatment and lost future income. 96 She has
acquired more than $20,000 in expenses for expert witness fees and
attorney’s fees. 97 Vicky’s losses are calculated at $497,819.86 and
her attorney also regularly requested restitution in the full amount
from each defendant. 98
Because of the nature of the Internet and the ease of access to
the images of Amy and Vicky, defendants were brought to trial,
convicted, and sentenced in district courts across the country. Prior
to the Paroline decision, some courts awarded nothing, some courts
ordered full restitution, and some courts entered a restitution
amount somewhere in between. 99 The primary issue in determining
the restitution award is whether proximate cause is a necessary
condition to the losses listed in subsections (A)-(E) of the
Mandatory Restitution Act or only to “any other losses” where the
proximate-result requirement is attached. 100 Federal appellate courts
were split in the results. The Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
determined in In re Unknown, that the proximate-result requirement
only applies to the last catchall provision. 101 Nearly all other circuit
courts ruled that the proximate-result requirement applied to all
losses, some even awarding no restitution after determining that
there was not a sufficient causal connection between the victim’s
losses and the defendant’s actions. 102 A separate issue discussed in
these cases was how to split the required full restitution amount

95. Id.
96. Id. (citation omitted).
97. Id. (citation omitted).
98. Id.
99. Lorelei Laird, Pricing Amy: Should Those Who Download Child Pornography Pay the
Victims?, 98 A.B.A. J. 48, 51 (2012).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3) (1996).
101. Laird, supra note 99, at 51–52; see In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 774 (5th Cir.
2012) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014).
102. Laird, supra note 99, at 52.
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among defendants, both known and unknown, current and future,
in unpredictable numbers. 103
On February 3, 2009, one defendant, Doyle Randall Paroline,
pled guilty to possessing two images of Amy. 104 Amy sought
restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 2259, and the Fifth District Court
declined to award restitution. 105 The victim then sought a writ of
mandamus, which was eventually granted en banc in consolidated
appeals from the United States District Courts for the Eastern
District of Texas and the Eastern District of Louisiana, incorporating
Michael Wright as a defendant. 106 The Fifth District Court held that
each defendant who possessed the victim’s images should be liable
for the entire amount of the losses of that victim. 107 Ultimately, the
case made its way to the Supreme Court, where it was argued on
January 22, 2014 and decided on April 23, 2014. 108
Several parties with an interest in the outcome filed amicus curiae
briefs. One of the most relevant of these briefs was submitted by a
bipartisan group of United States senators in support of Amy
Unknown. Each of the amici served in the 103rd Congress that
passed the provision at issue in the Paroline case and “are deeply
interested in ensuring that child-pornography victims like Amy
receive the restitution to which they are entitled . . . [and] have a
fundamental and institutional interest in seeing Congress’s
enactments enforced as they are written.” 109 The bipartisan brief

103. Id. For example, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children has
obtained more than 35,000 “extremely graphic” images of Amy’s abuse in over 3200 cases. In
re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 752.
104. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2014); United States v. Paroline,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7422 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2009).
105. United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 782 (E.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d, 134 S.
Ct. 1710 (2014).
106. In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d.
107. Id. at 752.
108. Paroline, 134 S. Ct.
109. Brief for United States Senators Orrin G. Hatch, Dianne Feinstein, Charles E.
Grassley, Edward J. Markey, John McCain, Patty Murray, and Charles E. Schumer as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent, Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (No. 128561) [hereinafter Brief for United States Senators].
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functions as a synopsis of the intentions of Congress in passing the
provisions and an aid to the courts in interpreting the statutes.
The American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children
(APSAC) also submitted an amicus curiae to the Supreme Court in
support of Amy Unknown. The APSAC is the leading national
organization that supports the professionals who treat children and
their families who have been affected by child sex abuse and child
pornography. 110 It submitted the brief “to assist the Court in
understanding the most recent science documenting the nature and
harm done to victims by the market in child pornography.”111
Amicus briefs in support of Amy Unknown were also filed by
multiple parties with interest in the case. 112
Despite the overwhelming support demonstrated on behalf of
the respondents in the amicus briefs, the Supreme Court vacated the
decision and remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit, concluding
that the proximate-cause requirement applied to the losses in all
subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 2259, and that restitution could only be
ordered to the extent that the defendant’s offense proximately
caused the victim’s losses. 113 District courts should, therefore, assess
in the best way it could from the evidence, the weight of the
defendant’s conduct in comparison with the broader process that
produced the losses. 114 Amy’s case was remanded to the district court
for a new calculation of restitution.

110. APSAC Brief, supra note 43, at 1.
111. Id. at 2.
112. The briefs were filed by the National Crime Victim Bar Association, et al., the
Women’s and Children’s Advocacy Project, and Justice for Children, Mothers Against Drunk
Driving, the National District Attorneys Association, the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children, victims in other related proceedings, “Vicky” and “Andy,” ECPAT
International, the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project et al., the
Dutch National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings and Sexual Violence Against
Children, the National Association to Protect Children, the State of Washington, et al., and
the National Crime Victim Law Institute et al. Paroline v. United States, Proceedings and
Orders, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/paroline-v-unitedstates/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
113. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1720–22.
114. Id. at 1727–29.
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IV. THE PAROLINE DECISION: PROBLEMS PRESENTED AND THE
SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION
The majority opinion in Paroline primarily rested on the
interpretation of two statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2259 and 18 U.S.C. §
3771. The tools that courts should use in interpreting statutes are
commonly debated and the subject of many books and articles. The
debate over judicial statutory interpretation is often described in
opposing models: the faithful-agent model (encompassing textualism
and intentionalism) 115 and a best-answer approach. 116 The majority
decision in Paroline, however, is not justified by either the faithfulagent model or a best-answer approach under the canons of
construction, nor according to purposes of Congress as evidenced in
legislative history.

115. JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION 201 (2010). As the name suggests, “the assumption that judges must act as
Congress’s faithful agent” is the basic premise of this philosophy. Id. A proponent of the
faithful-agent model might claim that courts should be guarded in decisions and that
“judges are no more competent than others to engage large issues of political theory . . . .
[J]udges of divergent political persuasions can discern the original meaning of texts without
making political judgments of their own . . . . [A] judge . . . need not undertake political
and moral analysis in individual cases.” KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 10–11 (1999); see also John F. Manning, Textualism and
the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001). To do this, courts should look to
the plain meaning of the original text and the canons of statutory construction (textualism),
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 231–
37 (2d ed. 2006), and rely on legislative intent by looking to the specific intent of
Congress, imaginative reconstruction, and the general intent or purpose Congress had when
enacting the statute (intentionalism). Id. at 221–30.
116. MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 115, at 201−02. In the best-answer
approach, judges act more like Congress’s junior partners than as agents of Congress. Id.
Judges have more participation in shaping legislation through interpretation and though the
interpretation proceeds from a statute, their decisions need not be strictly bound by
congressional instruction. Id. Guido Calabresi proposed “a new relationship between courts
and statutes, a relationship that would enable us to retain the legislative initiative in
lawmaking . . . while restoring to courts their common law function of seeing to it that the law
is kept up to date.” GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 7
(1982). Ronald Dworkin posited that a judge should “see his own role as fundamentally the
creative one of a partner continuing to develop, in what he believes is the best way, the
statutory scheme Congress began.” RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 313 (1986).
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A. Proximate-Cause Requirement
In Paroline, the Supreme Court held that a victim must prove
that costs for which the victim seeks restitution stem from the
offense in question. The cause must be proximate, not simply a
factual link (i.e., there must be a sufficient connection between the
offense and the restitution costs requested). 117 In coming to this
holding, the Supreme Court did not adhere to the customary
standards expected for statutory interpretation. Because Congress
would anticipate that the courts would use these conventional
methods when interpreting the statute, the Supreme Court acted in
a way that rejected Congress’s intent and purpose in passing the
Mandatory Restitution Act. Furthermore, the Court did so with full
knowledge of what Congress had intended because of the bi-partisan
amicus brief filed by those who spearheaded the statute, which
explained the interpretive methods Congress was relying on when it
wrote and enacted the statute. 118 The interpretive methods Congress
anticipated courts using include: a) the plain meaning of the text; b)
the rule of the last antecedent; c) the presumption against
surplusage; and d) use of legislative history. “Where the statute’s
plain text, its legislative history, and multiple canons of statutory
interpretation all speak with one voice, the Court’s job is not a
difficult one.” 119
1. Canons of construction
The judiciary uses canons of construction as interpretive
guidelines for determining the meaning of statutes that have
ambiguity. The cardinal canon of construction that should be used
before all others in interpreting a statute is the plain meaning of the
text. “[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what
it means and means in a statute what it says there.” 120 With regard to
the Mandatory Restitution Act, the senators argued in their brief,

117.
118.
119.
120.

Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1720–22.
See supra text accompanying note 109.
Brief for United States Senators, supra note 109, at 3.
Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (citations omitted).
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“[t]he statute’s meaning is plain, and it should be enforced as it was
written.” 121 The statute’s text clearly requires that the “proximate
result” limitation only applies to subsection (F). 122
Under the Mandatory Restitution Act, “qualifying as a
‘victim’ . . . is the only causal nexus required to recover for the five
categories of specific costs listed in subsections (A)–(E).” The
catchall category in the sixth subsection includes “an undefined and
potentially unpredictable set of costs. For costs falling into that less
predictable category only, Congress included an additional
‘proximate result’ constraint.” 123 Subsections (A)–(E) do not require
proximate cause, only that the individual meet the requirements of a
“victim” according to the definition in the statute. “That is the
statue Congress wrote, and this Court need look no further than its
plain language . . . .” 124
The distinction between the “proximate result” constraint in
subsection (F) and the lack thereof in subsections (A)–(E) “reflects
Congress’s sound policy judgment to allow victims to recover certain
identifiable and predictable losses with a threshold showing of basic
causation (i.e., ‘victim’ status), and to likewise prevent victims from
recovering ‘any other’ potentially more attenuated losses unless they
can satisfy a proximate cause requirement.” 125
The Supreme Court, however, took a different reading of “the
threshold question” of “whether § 2259 limits restitution to those
losses proximately caused by the defendant’s offense conduct.” 126
The Court ignored the plain language of the congressional statutory
mandate to award the victim full restitution for the costs in
subsections (A)–(E), instead turning to a common-law
understanding of proximate cause. Citing the Restatement (Third) of
Torts, the majority declared that “[t]he concept of proximate
causation is applicable in both criminal and tort law, and . . . is often

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

344

Brief for United States Senators, supra note 109, at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 5.
Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 81–82.
Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2014).
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explicated in terms of foreseeability or the scope of the risk created
by the predicate conduct.” 127 Further, the majority stated, “A
requirement of proximate cause thus serves, inter alia, to preclude
liability in situations where the causal link between conduct and
result is so attenuated that the consequence is more aptly described
as mere fortuity.” 128
Congress, basing its decision on carefully weighed research and
evidence, determined that proximate cause was already sufficiently
established by possessors of child pornography—there is no
difference to the victim between those who possess and those who
cause the images to be produced and distributed. 129 “[F]rom the
perspective of the victim, . . . there is no meaningful difference
between the creator, the viewers, or the distributors of pornographic
images. They are all participants in a marketplace of child
pornography [who] . . . inflict pain and suffering on the victims.”130
As such, all the participants both known and unknown, current
offenders and future offenders, are players in a perpetual, indivisible
harm. Therefore, the losses delineated in subsections (A)–(E) did not
require that proximate cause be proven for each individual
defendant. The Court dismissed the congressional findings based on
academic experts and research, and instead determined that the
defendant had only to pay for the losses caused by “the conduct of
the particular defendant from whom restitution is sought,” ignoring
the complex causality inherent in the defendant’s actions that
Congress had considered. 131 The majority concluded that “Paroline’s
possession of two images of the victim was surely not sufficient to
cause her entire losses from the ongoing trade in her images”132
despite Congress’s considerations. Thus, the Court second-guessed
Congress’s ability to determine the allocation of the harms to the
victims among plaintiffs and rejected the Act’s plain meaning in favor

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
See supra text accompanying notes 71–76.
APSAC Brief, supra note 43, at 2.
Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1720.
Id. at 1723.
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of an interpretation that reflected its own understanding of the
harms that victims suffer. The Court reasoned that, “[g]iven
proximate cause’s traditional role in causation analysis,” the Court
could “[find] a proximate-cause requirement built into a statute that
did not expressly impose one” 133 even where Congress deliberately
omitted it. In so doing, the majority effectively overrode the statute
as it was written in the legislative process and rewrote it through the
judicial process.
The Court came to this decision despite having the explicit
intent of Congress to not impose a proximate-cause requirement
verified by multiple congressional actors who had played an active
role in getting § 2259 passed. 134 The majority sought to justify this
decision by using the “proximate result” language that appears in the
statue’s text. 135 However, several canons of statutory interpretation
support the opposite interpretation that the proximate-result
requirement only applies to subsection (F). 136
Another canon of construction is the rule of the last
antecedent. This canon states that “a limiting clause or
phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun
or phrase that it immediately follows.” 137 This canon, Justices
Scalia and Garner noted, is “the legal expression of a
commonsense principle of grammar.” 138 While this rule can be
overcome by other “textual indication[s] of contrary
meaning,” 139 there must be something “to justify tossing aside
the rules of grammar and statutory interpretation.” 140

133. Id. at 1720 (citations omitted).
134. See supra text accompanying note 109.
135. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1719–20.
136. Brief for United States Senators, supra note 109, at 11.
137. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003).
138. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 144 (2012). “It is clearly desirable that an anaphoric (backward-looking)
or cataphoric (forward-looking) pronoun should be placed as near as the construction
allows to the noun or noun phrase to which it refers, and in such a manner that there is no
risk of ambiguity.” Id. (quoting FOWLER’S MODERN ENGLISH USAGE (R.H Burchfield ed.,
3d ed. 1996)).
139. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1344 (2013) (confirming that
the rule of the last antecedent should be applied unless textually indicated otherwise); cf. Porto

346

07.LAWRENCE.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

325

8/4/2016 6:11 PM

The Peril of Paroline

This canon has been relied on by the Supreme Court 141 and
circuit courts when interpreting statutes 142 and by Congress when
authoring statutes. Professor Cassell et al. shows how the Supreme
Court’s use of the rule of the last antecedent has been applied in two
cases, Barnhart v. Thomas 143 and Porto Rico Railway, Light &
Power Co. v. Mor. 144
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Barnhart contributes a
precedent for how the rule of the last antecedent should apply to the
Mandatory Restitution Act. 145 In Barnhart, the Court acknowledged
that, “although the rule of the last antecedent ‘is not absolute,’ the
relative clause . . . modified only the noun phrase that it immediately
follows, . . . but not the preceding noun-phrase . . . . [I]t is wrong to
read qualifying language . . . as applying broadly throughout [the
statute] generally. Doing so ‘stretches the modifier too far.’”146 In
general, the last antecedent modifies only the phrase that
immediately precedes it.
In Porto Rico Railway, the Court discussed the use of the seriesqualifier canon as applied to series elements in “a long sentence,
unbroken by numbers, letters, or bullets, with two complex noun
phrases sandwiching the conjunction.” 147 The Court in Porto Rico

Rico Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345, 346–49 (1920) (finding that there
were “special reasons” to apply the limiting language to both preceding phrases where the
provision in question was a lengthy sentence, not divided into subsections and separated only
by commas, and the interpretation was necessary “to effectuate the general purpose of
Congress” and avoid “assuredly unintended discrimination”).
140. Brief for United States Senators, supra note 109, at 12.
141. Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 82–86.
142. See, e.g., Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 P.3d 825, 832 (9th Cir. 1996)
(remarking that the circuit courts have “long followed this interpretive principle”).
143. 540 U.S. 20 (2003).
144. 253 U.S. 345 (1920).
145. Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 83–84.
146. Id. (quoting Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 26, and Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enf’t,
543 U.S. 335, 342 (2005)).
147. In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 763 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), rev’d sub nom.
Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014); see also Porto Rico Railway, 253 U.S. at
346 (quoting Jones Act of March 2, 1917, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951, 965). The statutory
provision analyzed in Porto Rico Railway states: “Said district court shall have jurisdiction of all
controversies where all of the parties on either side of the controversy are citizens or subjects of
a foreign State or States, or citizens of a State, Territory, or District of the United States not
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Railway reasons that the clause ″not domiciled in Porto Rico”
should be read so as to apply to all the series elements in the phrase
“citizens or subjects of a foreign State or States, or citizens of a State,
Territory, or Districts of the United States” as a “natural
construction of the language.” 148 This was especially appropriate
given the intent of Congress in passing the statute. If there was some
doubt as to the application of the clause to every series element, the
Court “should so construe the provision as to effectuate the general
purpose of Congress.” 149
The structure of § 2259 clearly shows that each subsection is
designed to function as a fully independent element because the
elements are lettered and separated by semicolons, and the limiting
language in one subsection does not apply to the others. 150 The
“proximate result” requirement should, therefore, only apply to the
subsection in which it appears (the loosely defined “other losses”),
and not the five preceding antecedents (such as the medical
expenses, lost income, and attorney’s fees). This interpretation is also
justified by the textual indications of meaning because it supports the
statutory mandate that victims obtain full restitution. 151
The Fifth Circuit persuasively distinguishes the provision in the
Mandatory Restitution Act from the provision in Porto Rico
Railway. 152 In contrast to Porto Rico Railway, in § 2259, the
introductory phrase “‘full amount of the victim’s losses’ includes any
costs incurred by the victim for—” is formed with a noun and verb
that feeds into a list of six eligible losses. 153 All of these enumerated
items function as independent objects, each of which completes the
phrase. Only the last of these enumerated items has the limiting
“proximate result” requirement. Furthermore, an em-dash sets the

domiciled in Porto Rico . . . .” Id.; In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 762–63 (5th Cir.
2012) (en banc), rev’d sub nom; Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (discussing
the canon of the rule of the last antecedent).
148. Porto Rico Railway, 253 U.S. at 348.
149. Id.
150. Brief for the United States Senators, supra note 109, at 12.
151. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (2012).
152. In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 762–63.
153.
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list apart from the introductory phrase and semi-colons separate each
of the elements, providing
a divided grammatical structure that does not resemble the statute in
Porto Rico Railway, with its flowing sentence that lacks any distinct
separations . . . . The structural and grammatical differences between
§ 2259 and the statute in Porto Rico Railway forcefully counsel
against applying Porto Rico Railway to the current statute to reach
the Paroline district court’s reading. 154

Scalia and Garner validate the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation,
clarifying that “semicolons insulate words from grammatical
implications that would otherwise be created by the words that
precede or follow them.” 155 In other words, what happens in a
subpart ending in a semicolon, stays in that subpart ending. 156 To
apply the “proximate cause” constraint to the medical services
costs in § 2259, the reader must go backwards through four
separate semicolons. 157
Furthermore, should the reader find any ambiguity in the
statute, the contextual considerations in the statute reveal the
congressional purpose that should be used when interpreting the
statute. The Fifth Circuit noted that imposing the “proximate cause”
constraint on the last “catchall” miscellaneous other loss provision
only and not to the earlier provisions listing expenses that are more
clearly demarcated and straightforwardly determined “makes sense”
in light of Congress’s purpose. 158 “[B]y construction, Congress knew
the kinds of expense necessary for restitution under subsections A
through E.” And, by definition, Congress “could not anticipate what
victims would propose under the open-ended subsection F” (“any
other losses suffered by the victim”). 159

154. In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 763.
155. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 138, at 162.
156. Id. at 157–58.
157. Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 86.
158. In re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d at 198, rev’d sub nom. Paroline v. United States,
134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014).
159. Id.
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The majority in Paroline rejects the rule of the last antecedent,
incorrectly analogizing to Porto Rico Railway instead of
distinguishing it based on syntax and structure, 160 declaring instead
that “[catchall] clauses are to be read as bringing within a statute
categories similar in type to those specifically enumerated.”161
Despite Congress’s clearly stated intent to the contrary, 162 the
majority found that the “other losses suffered . . . as a proximate
result of the offense” 163 would be “most naturally understood as a
summary of the type of losses covered.” 164 This finding is justified by
“common sense,” and was declared to be in accordance with the
Court’s previously erroneous understanding of proximate cause as it
pertains to this type of crime and these victims. The Court ignores
Congress’s judgment and instead substitutes its own view of “the
causal link between conduct and result,” finding that it is too
“attenuated” and “more akin to mere fortuity.” 165
The Court then turns to an absurd illustration first posited in
United States v. Monzell 166 to show the need for a more strict
application of the proximate-cause requirement. The majority
proposes that if a victim on the way to therapy needed as a result of
an offense were to get in a car accident, requiring the defendant to
pay for the expenses associated with the car accident “would be
strange indeed.” 167 The court in Monzel argues that without a
proximate-cause standard, a cause-in-fact standard is all that would
apply, and the superseding event would not limit the liability of the
defendant for medical expenses occurring as a result of the car
accident. 168 However, this is an incorrect interpretation of the types
of expenses listed in subsections (A)–(E). Under a strict reading, the
medical expenses relating to the car accident would not fall under
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
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See supra text accompanying notes 152–157.
Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1721 (citation omitted).
See supra text accompanying notes 117–118.
18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(F) (2012).
Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1721.
Id. at 1719, 1721.
United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 537 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1721.
Monzel, 641 F.3d at 537 n.8.
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(A) as “medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or
psychological care.” This expense would not “relate to” the medical
care for the abuse. So, even though the accident may be directly
caused by pursuing the care in subsection (A), thus meeting a “butfor” causation standard, the care for the car accident injuries would
not be one of the enumerated expenses and must, therefore, only be
covered under subsection (F). This type of expense would already be
subject to the “proximate result” limitation that adheres to
subsection (F). There is no need to extend that limitation to the
other subsections in an attempt to limit expenses to those that can be
attributed to the defendant. Contrary to the Court’s interpretation,
this example illustrates Congress’s reasoning for the catchall category
in subsection (F)—a limitation that prevents these types of expenses
from growing out of control.
The presumption against surplusage canon provides that the
court has a duty “to give effect, if possible to every clause and word
of a statute.” 169 To hold that the limiting language in subsection (F)
of § 2259 applies to other subsections would create surplusage. As a
rule, “Congress’s words should not be reduced to redundancy where
a reading that gives them logical effect is readily available.” 170 In
interpreting the statute, if the proximate-result requirement extends
to subsections (A)–(E), the specification of what losses qualify under
mandatory restitution would be redundant—they would all be
included under subsection (F), 171 which states that “the victim’s
losses includes any costs incurred by the victim for . . . any . . . losses
suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense.” 172
The Court finds the argument that the first five subsections
“would be superfluous if all were governed by a proximate-cause
requirement . . . unpersuasive.” 173 The Court, again in direct contrast
to the intent of Congress as stated in the amicus curiae brief, 174 finds
169. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (quoting United States v. Menasche,
348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. Brief for United States Senators, supra note 109, at 13.
171. Id.
172. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(F) (2012).
173.
174.

Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1721.
See supra text accompanying notes 118–119.
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an alternate explanation that subsections (A)–(E) were meant to
“provide guidance . . . as to the specific types of losses Congress
thought would often be the proximate result.” 175 This interpretation
might be sustainable if the amicus curiae brief in the hands of the
Court had not directly contradicted it, and if Congress had made any
indication in the statute that this was the case. Congress could have
put subsection (F) first, and listed (A)–(E) as examples of expenses as
a “proximate result” of the offense or used the phrase “such as” in
listing subsections (A)–(E). But this is not what Congress wrote, and
it is a stretched interpretation that ignores both the plain meaning of
the statute and the congressional intent.
2. Legislative history
Another widely held tenet of statutory interpretation is that if
there is any ambiguity in a statute’s text, courts should consider a
statute’s text “in light of the objectives Congress sought to
achieve.” 176 In the Mandatory Restitution Act, “the drafting
history . . . makes clear that Congress really did mean what it
said.” 177 The Act was meant “to [p]rovide [g]enerous [r]estitution to
[v]ictims.” 178 Mandatory restitution for sex-crime victims was
intended to be “a key mechanism for achieving the Act’s goals” 179 of
being “the cornerstone of the movement to make the United States
a safer place for women” 180 by “provid[ing] ‘powerful protection and
assistance’ to the ‘[w]omen and children who are the innocent
victims of domestic violence.’” 181
Another indication of congressional intent is found by the
changes Congress made to the bill before it was ratified. “Where
Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but
175. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1721.
176. Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n, 389 U.S. 463, 469 (1968).
177. Brief for United States Senators, supra note 109, at 3.
178. Id. at 5.
179. Id. at 6.
180. Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing on S.15 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 185 (1991).
181. Brief for United States Senators, supra note 109, at 6 (quoting 139 CONG. REC.
S1281 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller)).
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deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation
was not intended.” 182 The original draft of the VAWA restitution
provisions
“contain[ed]
two
express
‘proximate
result’
limitations.” 183 In the enacted version, one of the “limitation[s] was
deleted from the Act[] . . . prior to its passage . . . confirm[ing] that
Congress acted intentionally when it included proximate-cause
requirements for some kinds of costs and omitted them for
others.” 184 “It beggars belief that Congress’s decision to delete the
‘proximate result’ language in the lost-income subsection was a sub
silentio decision to incorporate proximate-cause principles into all of
the subsections.” 185
An additional indication of Congress’s intent can be found in the
deletion of the word “direct” from the definition of “victim.” In the
original draft, a “victim” was defined as “any person who has
suffered direct physical, emotional, or pecuniary harm as a result of a
commission of a crime under this chapter.” 186 “[W]hen the statute
was enacted, all [provisions requiring mandatory restitution] defined
‘victim’ . . . as ‘the individual harmed as a result of a commission of a
crime under this chapter,’” 187 thus eliminating the requirement for
“direct” harm.
Compare this mandatory-restitution provision in the Violence
Against Women Act, written as a part of the larger Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act, with the mandatory-restitution
provision in another part of that larger Act, the Senior Citizens
Against Marketing Scams Act of 1994. 188 The Senior Citizens
Against Marketing Scams Act defines the term “victim” as “a person
directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an
offense for which restitution may be ordered.” 189 Furthermore, the

182. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23–24 (1983).
183. Brief for United States Senators, supra note 109, at 3.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 9.
186. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 101-545, at 5, 17 (1990)) (emphasis removed).
187. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 2248(c), 2259(c), 2264(c) (2012)).
188. Id. at 10 (citing Senior Citizens Against Marketing Scams Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-332, 108 Stat. 2082 (1994)).
189. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2327(c) (2012)).
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Act also “defines the ‘full amount of the victim’s losses’ as ‘all losses
suffered by the victim as a proximate cause of the offense.’” 190 The
purposeful inclusion of a proximate-cause requirement in this Act
“demonstrates that Congress knew how to impose a general
proximate-cause requirement when it wished to,” 191 and chose not to
make the victims defined in § 2259 restricted by the same
proximate-cause requirement in all recoverable costs. Instead, the
Act “carefully explain[s] that some costs are recoverable in all
circumstances while others are recoverable only with a showing of
proximate cause.” 192 The Court’s interpretation does not reflect the
carefully constructed statute in light of its drafting history.
B. Restitution
The Court in Paroline determined that restitution can be
ordered according to “the defendant’s relative role in the [larger]
process” of the harms to the victim and that defendants cannot be
held jointly and severally liable for the victim’s losses. 193 However,
this does not comport with the legislative intent of Congress, who
intended that victims be fully compensated for their losses. 194
When Congress enacted the first victim restitution provision as
part of the Victim and Witness Protection Act in 1982, the
Committee on the Judiciary reported to the Senate the justification
for requiring restitution from defendants:
The principle of restitution is an integral part of virtually every
formal system of criminal justice, of every culture and every time. It
holds that, whatever else the sanctioning power of society does to
punish its wrongdoers, it should also ensure that the wrongdoer is

190. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2327(b)(3) (2012)).
191. Id.; see Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enf’t. 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005) (“We do
not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it
nonetheless intends to apply, and our reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown
elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to make such a requirement manifest.”).
192. Brief for United States Senators, supra note 109, at 10.
193. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1727–29 (2014).
194. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (2012).
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required to the degree possible to restore the victim to his or her
prior state of well-being. 195

This comports with common principles of restitution found in
tort law. Although the Mandatory Restitution Act is part of a
criminal statute, its function is similar to a tort claim in its effect—
making the victim whole from the losses caused by the defendant. 196
As such, the court “on appellate review in Monzel . . . concluded that
‘tort doctrine [would] inform[ its] thinking’” in matters of
restitution. 197 The Supreme Court recognizes that restitution serves
purposes that, although different in some respects from the purposes
of tort law, also overlap in some respects. 198
Harper et al. note that “[t]he primary notion [for awarding
restitution] is that of repairing [the] injury or of making [the victim]
whole as nearly as that may be done by an award of money.”199
Harper et al. also describe compensation as “a natural enough
corollary of the fault principle . . . . [I]t seems eminently fair that
these damages should (at least) put the plaintiff as nearly as may be
in the same position he would have been in if defendant’s wrong had
caused no injury.” 200 The primary goal of the courts should be to
make the victims whole to the extent possible, which requires full
restitution in a timely manner so that the victims can get the care
and services they need.

195. S. REP. No. 104-179, at 12–13 (1995) (quoting Judiciary Comm., S. REP. No. 97532, at 30 (1982)).
196. Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 92–93.
197. Id. (quoting United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 535 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
Although § 2259 is a criminal statute, it functions much like a tort statute by
directing the court to make a victim whole for losses caused by the responsible
party. “Functionally, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is a tort statute, though
one that casts back to a much earlier era of Anglo-American law, when criminal and
tort proceedings were not clearly distinguished.”
Monzel, 641 F.3d at 535 n.5 (quoting United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir.
1999)) (citation omitted).
198. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1724 (“Aside from the manifest procedural differences
between criminal sentencing and civil tort lawsuits, restitution serves purposes that differ from
(though they overlap with) the purposes of tort law.”).
199. 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1 (2d ed. 1986).
200. Id.
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In apparent disregard of the extensive professional research
available to Congress, the Court determined that “Paroline’s
contribution to the causal process underlying the victim’s losses [as a
single possessor] was very minor.” 201 This notion ignores the way the
demand for child pornography creates the supply, 202 and, more
importantly, the real harm to the victim caused by even one
defendant’s possession—a harm that cannot be extricated from the
aggregate harm of potentially tens of thousands of possessors.203
Although the Court acknowledged that “the victim suffers
continuing and grievous harm as a result of her knowledge that a
large, indeterminate number of individuals have viewed and will in
the future view images of the sexual abuse she endured,” and that
“[t]he unlawful conduct of everyone who reproduces, distributes, or
possesses the images of the victim’s abuse—including Paroline—
plays a part in sustaining and aggravating this tragedy,” the Court
refused to hold the defendant liable for the full amount of damages
fearing that it might inconvenience the guilty defendant when he
faces difficulty trying to seek the right to contribution from other
defendants, 204 which the Court seemed to find to be a more serious
infraction than inconveniencing the innocent victim. 205
This does not comport with the principles of tort law that
overlap with the restitution orders of criminal sentencing.
“[W]hoever does an injury to another is liable in damages to the
extent of that injury.” 206 It was Congress’s aim, clearly stated, to

201. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1725.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 46–49.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 71–73.
204. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1725–26.
205. Id. at 1729 (“Congress has not promised victims full and swift resolution.”). But
Congress did state in the declaration in the Crime Victim’s Rights that a crime victim has
“[t]he right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6) (2012).
The Court apparently finds it acceptable to “consign [victims] to ‘piecemeal’ restitution and
leave [them] to face ‘decades of litigation that might never lead to full recovery.’” Paroline,
134 S. Ct. at 1729 (quoting Brief for Respondent Amy at 57, Paroline, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (No.
12-8561), 2013 WL 6056611). “Of course the victim should someday collect restitution for
all her child-pornography losses, but it makes sense to spread payment among a larger number
of offenders . . . .” Id.
206. 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 199 (citations omitted).
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award the victim the full amount of her losses. 207 Victims will not be
receiving a windfall—they are only able to recover for actual expenses
related to and caused by the offense under § 2259 in a criminal
sentencing hearing. Moreover, when a person “intentionally or
recklessly causes harm,” that actor “is subject to liability for a
broader range of harms than the harms for which that actor would
be liable if only acting negligently.” 208 Those who possess child
pornography are intentional tortfeasors, a realm where proximate
cause is rarely a factor. 209
Furthermore, the majority ignores the fact that the defendant is
acting in concert with the producers, distributors, and other
possessors, despite the fact that he may have had “no contact with
the overwhelming majority” and that they are “geographically and
temporally distant.” 210 Although “[o]ur present system . . . has
traditionally focused attention on the defendant’s individual fault,
and the limitations on defendant’s liability bear the mark of the fault
formula,” 211 there are well-established tort principles that an
intentional wrongdoer is jointly and severally liable with other
wrongdoers for an innocent victim’s losses. 212 Where there is an
innocent victim who suffers an indivisible harm (a harm that can’t be
determined who is responsible for what part of the harm among the
207. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (2012).
208. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 33 (AM. LAW INST. 2005).
209. Sandra F. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1199,
1206 (2013).
In intentional tort cases “the defendant’s wrongful conduct is closely linked—
temporally and conceptually—to the plaintiff’s harm.” Few intentional tort cases
involve multiple causal factors. Further, the intent requirement makes it clearer that
the defendant should be held accountable for its actions, and courts express less
concern about extending liability in this context. Thus, the necessity and strength of
proximate cause doctrine severely diminishes in the intentional tort context. When
proximate cause is relevant in intentional tort cases, proximate cause analysis may
cut off liability for the defendant in fewer circumstances than it would when applied
to negligence.
Id. at 1206–07 (quoting Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities
Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 832 (2009)) (citations omitted).
210. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1725.
211. HARPER ET AL., supra note 199, at 130–31.
212. Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 89.
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defendants), 213 and all defendants are guilty (particularly when they
are intentional tortfeasors), 214 the defendants should bear the
responsibility for the entire burden and that part of the burden that
the co-offenders cannot or will not cover. 215
Justice Sotomayor acknowledges in her dissent that individual
offenders act in concert as part of a larger network with knowledge
of their roles and the larger harm their actions cause to the victim.216
Therefore, a causal link is established in an indivisible harm and they
should be held liable in full. 217 Justice Roberts also notes that there is
no way to prove what exact part of the harm was caused by the
defendant’s actions; therefore, any amount of damages must be
arbitrarily decided and the injury to the victim is not divisible.218
These opinions, though not sustained by the majority, are more in
line with common law principles and help to fulfill Congress’s
purpose to award the victim the full amount of her losses. As
Sotomayor opines in her dissent, the statute requires full restitution
to the victim. 219
In a lower court decision, Monzel, the court declined to hold
Monzel jointly and severally liable for all of Amy’s losses in its
restitution order, citing “substantial logistical difficulties in tracking
awards made and money actually recovered.” 220 Although this

213. See id. at 96–101.
214. “[E]ach person who commits a tort that requires intent is jointly and severally liable
for any indivisible injury legally caused by the tortious conduct.” Id. at 102 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 12 (2000)). “[T]here is, so
far as we are aware, no authority whatsoever for exempting intentional tortfeasors from joint
and several liability.” Id.
215. See id. at 96–109.
216. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1741 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, one
expert describes Internet child pornography networks as ‘an example of a complex criminal
conspiracy,’—the quintessential concerted action to which joint and several liability attaches.”)
(citation omitted).
217. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 1732–33 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 1739–40 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
220. United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting United
States v. Church, 701 F. Supp. 2d 814, 832 (W.D. Va. 2010)).
Using what it described as ‘traditional principles’ of tort law, the court rejected
Amy’s argument that Monzel should be held jointly and severally liable for all of her
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difficulty will occur and need to be dealt with appropriately, the
difficulty should not be a burden the victim has to bear. It should
more justly fall on the defendants and the government.
“[T]raditional tort law principles strongly support the conclusion
that § 2259 should be read to impose liability on each child
pornography defendant and that each defendant should be liable for
the full amount of their victim’s losses,” because “child pornography
victims suffer indivisible losses that intentional tortfeasors (i.e.,
criminals) must jointly and severally pay in their entirety.” 221
C. The Paroline Decision: An Example of Judicial Overreach and
Judicial Activism
Ultimately, what branch of government should make particular
decisions relies on several important factors that should be balanced
in determining the comparative institutional competence to reach
particular decisions. 222
[The] indicia of comparative competencies include the relevant
grants of constitutional power over the issues; the ability of the
judiciary to develop consistent, workable standards to govern the
determination; the role of political accountability in determining
the appropriate respect due to competing sovereigns; the ability to
tailor solutions and respond flexibly to changing circumstances; the

losses because Monzel was essentially a joint tortfeasor with other criminals who had
caused her indivisible injuries. Because Monzel’s possession of a “single image” was
not independently sufficient to cause the entirety of Amy’s injury, the court
reasoned that it could not therefore be viewed as creating an ‘indivisible’ injury.
Likewise, because Amy suffered separate injuries each time someone viewed her
images, the defendant was obligated to pay restitution only for the separate injury
for which he was individually responsible.
Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 92–93. “Monzel’s possession of a single image of Amy was
neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of all of her losses. She would have suffered
tremendously from her sexual abuse regardless of what Monzel did.” Monzel, 641 F.3d at 538.
221. Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 90.
222. Michalyn Steele, Comparative Institutional Competency and Sovereignty in Indian
Affairs, 85 U. COLO. L. R. 759, 781 (2014). “This question of institutional competence is
very much related to traditional ‘separation of powers’ philosophy. As a feature of our
government, various institutions have been structured in different ways (with overlapping
powers) to achieve different goals.” Jason Mehta, The Development of Federal Professional
Responsibility Rules: The Effect of Institutional Choice on Rule Outcomes, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 57, 72 (2007).
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control over resource allocation questions that may factor into
policy determinations; and the subject matter expertise of the
branch involved. 223

Where problems are “polycentric,” or have “complex
repercussions” such that “adjudication cannot encompass and take
[them] into account,” these should not be within the policy-making
decisions of the judicial branch. 224
The principle of institutional competency is illustrated in a
landmark Supreme Court decision in 1982. In New York v. Ferber,
the Court held that child pornography was out of the reach of First
Amendment protections on free speech and that New York had
appropriately acted to protect the interests of children in prohibiting
the knowing promotion or distribution of sexual performances by
children under 16. 225 In reaching this decision, the Court
appropriately relied on reports from committee hearings in both the
House and the Senate, found that child pornography had “become a
serious national problem,” 226 and deferred to the legislative branches’
policy-making authority in this area.
This deference to Congress’s findings appropriately allocated the
fact-finding and policymaking aspects of legislation to the legislative
branch, allowing both the state legislatures and the United States
Congress to utilize their role as the legislative authority with the
accompanying political accountability to make laws that reflected the
political will of the people through their representatives. In contrast,
however, twenty-two years later in its Paroline decision, the Court
ignored the explicitly stated purposes and intentions of Congress,
including the plain language of the statute, and took on a policymaking role that should belong strictly in the hands of the political
branch. The Court went beyond its role of interpreter to judicial
activism, ignoring the careful deliberations of Congress when it

223. Steele, supra note 222 at 781.
224. Id. at 783 n.116 (quoting Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–95 (1978)).
225. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
226. Id. at 749. “[C]hild pornography and child prostitution have become highly
organized, multimillion dollar industries that operate on a nationwide scale.” Id. at 749 n.1
(quoting S. REP. NO. 95-348, p. 5 (1977)).
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enacted the Mandatory Restitution provision. The majority thought
it had a better way to “impress upon defendants that their acts are
not irrelevant or victimless.” 227 The majority, therefore, rejected the
statute as written, took a stretched interpretation that would fit their
purposes and policies, and effectively rewrote § 2259 to comport
with their ill-informed notions.
Having been left with the Paroline decision, which flatly
contradicts the stated intent of § 2259, Congress’s primary
recourse is to pass new legislation in order to correct the Court and
clarify its intentions, a time consuming and difficult process. In a
2014 proposed legislation that had bipartisan support in both
chambers, Congress essentially tells the Court that they got it
wrong in Paroline. The proposed Amy and Vicky Child
Pornography Victim Restitution Improvement Act of 2014, has 90
co-sponsors (59 Democrats and 31 Republicans) in the House, 228
and 23 supporters (11 Democrats and 12 Republicans) in the
Senate at the time of writing. 229
The amendment acknowledges that “[t]he unlawful collective
conduct of every individual who reproduces, distributes, or possesses
the images of a victim’s childhood sexual abuse plays a part in
sustaining and aggravating the harms to that individual victim,”
constituting “intentional crimes that combine to produce an
indivisible injury to a victim.” 230 As such, the amendment seeks to
adopt an aggregate causation standard, holding each defendant
jointly and severally liable with the ability to recover contributions.
The proposed amendment also addresses the “proximate result”
issue, clarifying that “in addition to the costs listed in subparagraph
(A),” such as medical expenses, lost income, therapy, transportation,
attorney’s fees, etc., “the term ‘full amount of the victim’s losses’
227. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1715 (2014).
228. Amy and Vicky Child Pornography Victim Restitution Improvement Act of 2014,
H.R. 4981, 113th Cong. (2014), reintroduced as Amy and Vicky Child Pornography Victim
Restitution Improvement Act of 2015, H.R. 595, 114th Cong. (2015) [hereinafter Amy and
Vicky Act]. The Amy and Vicky Act was referred to the Subcommittee on Crime, terrorism,
Homeland Security, and Investigations on Mar. 17, 2015. 2015 FED CRS SUM H.R. 595
(Westlaw), 114th Cong. (2015).
229. Id.
230. Id. at § 2(4).
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also includes any other losses suffered by the victim . . . if those
losses are a proximate result of the offense.” 231 Thus, the proposed
legislation states in a manner beyond dispute that the proximateresult limitation only applies to the catchall “other losses” provision
(as it had previously informed the Court in its amicus curiae brief). 232
D. Effects of the Paroline Decision
The Paroline decision has done little to help courts clarify the
amount of restitution that victims should be awarded. In cases being
decided post-Paroline, some courts have used “the Hernandez
approach,” which divides the total amount of the victim’s losses by
the number of standing restitution orders. 233 Other courts have used
the Gamble formulation for calculating restitution awards by dividing
the losses by the number of defendants convicted of the offense. 234
The District Court for the District of Rhode Island estimated a pool
of defendants at 1000 (approximately double the current number),
and accordingly awarded the victim 1/1000th (0.1%) of the
outstanding losses. 235 Another court, noting that Paroline is of
limited use in its suggested “starting point” for losses caused by
“continuing trafficking,” determined that the court would, instead,
consider the other factors discussed in Paroline. 236
Although the district courts appear to be using the guidelines
given in Paroline to implement appropriate restitution under § 2259,
the resulting awards vary considerably in the amount and the
method of calculation. Furthermore, some victims are not given any

231. Id. at § 3(1)(B).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 118–119.
233. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, No. 2:11-CR00026GEB, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 89688 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2014) (awarding victim $2,282.86 in restitution); United
States v. Watkins, No. 2:13-CR00268LKKAC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112420 (E.D. Cal.
Aug. 12, 2014) (awarding victim $2,191.74 in restitution).
234. See United States v. Gamble, 709 F.3d 541, 554 (6th Cir. 2012); see, e.g., United
States v. Galan, No. 6:11-CR60148AA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94377 (D. Or. July 11, 2014)
(awarding victim $3,433.00).
235. United States v. Crisostomi, No. 12-166M, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97513 (D. R.I.
July 16, 2014) (awarding one victim $713.68 and another victim $683.41).
236. United States v. Reynolds, No. 12-20843, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116854, at *15
(D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2014) (awarding one victim $11,000 and another $15,500).
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restitution if the court determines that the defendant did not
“knowingly receive[] an image” of the specified victim. 237 Victims are
required to submit restitution requests in each of the cases in which
they are identified as a victim. They bear the burden of justifying the
amount of their losses and recovering the amount they are awarded
from each defendant. This can be particularly onerous and harmful
as each new case is a reminder that their images are still in
circulation. One judge noted that “[t]hough the court has awarded
restitution, the negligible amount and piecemeal process under §
2259 can hardly be considered a victory for Cindy and other victims
like her.” 238 He further stated that the restitution award “does not
fully compensate losses suffered by child pornography victims and
may, in fact, dissuade victims from seeking restitution; the end result
is hardly worth yet another reminder of their continued
exploitation.” 239 The burden on the victim as the situation currently
stands is more than the victim should have to bear.
In the Paroline decision, the Court wants to avoid a situation
where “each possessor of the victim’s images would bear the
consequences of the acts of the many thousands who possessed those
images.” 240 Instead, the Court shifts this burden from the guilty
defendant to the innocent victim. However, this burden should
rightfully rest on those who wronged the victim by knowingly
appropriating his or her image—the defendants should be the one to
try to recover contributions from other defendants.
In Salt Lake City, the Utah Crime Victims Legal Clinic works
with district courts nationwide to try to secure some restitution for
Andy241 on a pro bono basis. 242 The Court’s decision in Paroline
creates an enormous workload for the clinic, which receives several
notices for each of the hundreds of defendants being prosecuted

237. Hernandez, No. 2:11-CR00026GEB at *16.
238. United States v. Galan, No. 6:11-CR60148AA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94377, at
*21–22 (D. Or. July 11, 2014).
239. Id. at 22.
240. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1724 (2014).
241. See supra Part I.
242. This information is based on the author’s experience working as an intern on these
cases in the summer of 2014.
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across the nation. The clinic must track each case and send in a
restitution request for each sentencing. Sometimes, the logistical
implications of the timing of the sentencing hearings makes it
difficult to get requests in before the judicially set deadlines.
Attorneys and interns have devoted thousands of hours to this task,
and are seeing limited success. Should Andy have to pay an attorney
for this legal service, the costs would be enormous and prohibitive.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress’s intent in the Mandatory Restitution Act was and is
plain. Victims of child pornography should be awarded the full
amount of their losses in restitution. Defendants should be held
jointly and severally liable, with the ability to seek compensation
from new defendants as the cases arise. Congress made its
intentions known in its amicus brief presented in the Paroline case,
which the Court largely disregarded. The Court also abandoned
several important canons of construction, leaving Congress less
capable of drafting legislation in a manner that they can predict will
be upheld by the courts. As a result of the Paroline decision,
Congress is working on new legislation that would, in effect,
overturn Paroline. The courts should interpret the “Paroline-fix” in
a way that effects the intentions of Congress and provides much
needed restitution to victims.
Janet Lawrence *
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